Title: Antisemitism is a form of racism – or is it?

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Abstract

The article discusses relationships between racism and antisemitism. It focuses on three major contestations which have taken place during the post WW2 era(s) regarding the ways racism, antisemitism and the relationships between them should be analysed. The first examines the different academic disciplinary approaches from which racism and antisemitism need to be studied. The second concerns the relationship between antisemitism, racism and modernity, introducing the notion of ‘new antisemitism’ which has become entangled in this contestation. The third examines how understanding racism and antisemitism relates to the theory and politics of intersectionality.

The article argues against exclusionary constructions of racism resulting from different forms of identity politics. It calls for an inclusive definition of racism in which vernacular and specific forms of racism can be contextualised and analysed within an encompassing de-centered non-Eurocentric definition of racism. Within such an analytical framework, antisemitism should be seen as a form of racism.

Keywords: antisemitism, intersectionality, modernity, ‘new antisemitism’, racism.

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**Main Text:**

**Introduction:**

The paper discusses the relationships between racism and antisemitism, focusing on several major contested narratives and debates relating to constructions and definitions of antisemitism and racism. While according to some, antisemitism is a form of racism, according to others it is not, or is even constructed in some ways as a zero-sum game relationship with it – i.e., that when you fight certain forms of racism you are necessarily antisemitic and vice versa. The paper argues that these conflictual constructions of racism and antisemitism are important because they have had divisive effects on antiracist discourses and solidarities and have caused harm to individuals and groupings when they become entrenched in law. More generally, they also reveal some of the theoretical as well as political problematics created when identity politics construct exclusionary conceptualisations of universal normative principles.

My position, as will be argued in the concluding section of the paper, is that antisemitism should be approached as a form of racism. I argue that the attempts to construct it as something different from racism suffer from both conceptual and moral inconsistencies and need to be opposed.

Definitions have no inherent truth. They are agreed conventions with underlying political values and interests of their own. However, they are also
not completely arbitrary and relativist. They are tested by their internal coherence as well as by their relationship to common sense, common practice and their reflections in and effects on historical developments. However, unless there are some commonalities of values and interests, a debate about definitions of certain concepts – and racism and antisemitism are among them – can become almost a mission impossible. Therefore, it is important to emphasise that the value system guiding this article is that of aspiration for social equality and social justice for all. The definition of racism I’m using in this paper is one with which I’ve been working for many years (e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Yuval-Davis, 2011) and which is also used by other sociologists, including in the report ‘Racism, Migration and the Hostile Environment in the UK, published shortly before the outbreak of Covid-19 by SSAHE, Social Scientists Against the Hostile Environment (2019), which was sponsored by the British Sociological Association and other major research groups and research centres in the UK working on these issues.

According to this approach, racism, or, rather, the process of racialisation, is a mode of thinking (cultural, ideological, historical) and practice (intersubjective, institutional, systemic) which constructs immutable boundaries between collectivities which are used to naturalise fixed hierarchical power relations between them. It has two central logics: that of exclusion, the ultimate form of which is genocide; and that of exploitation, the ultimate logic of which is slavery. In most concrete historical situations these two logics are practiced in a complementary way and involve various ways of hierarchisation, subjugation and the use of what are considered to be legitimate and illegitimate modes of violence. Any signifier of boundaries can be used to construct these racialisations, from the colour of the skin to the shape of the elbow to accent
or mode of dress. The meanings of these signifiers shift historically and are contested.

While there should not be a divisive competitive ‘Oppression Olympics’ (Hencock, 2011), as different racialisations have different effects, certain racialisations can become more or less important in specific locations and times. The meanings of these racialisation signifiers shift historically and not all racisms are equally intense. Some forms involve more structural formations than others. Visibility or invisibility of ‘the Other’ can trigger their own racialisations.

In the Report, three main narratives of collective belonging in the UK are identified – imperial, European and nativist. Different forms of racialisation, at different times, have drawn on each of these narratives. Anti-Black racism, anti-Muslim, anti-Roma and more are discussed. It argues that Jews in general, and specific groups of Jews in particular, have been racialised, excluded and exploited in different ways in different places in different periods of history and that different antisemitic narratives have described them in different, often contradictory ways (as poor, as rich, as capitalists, as revolutionary socialists, as migrants, as rulers of the world).

It is argued that like anti-black racism, antisemitic discourses are rooted in both religious and scientific traditions in Europe and have been constitutive of European narratives of collective belonging. However, at particular historical moments, they have drawn on nativist narratives of belonging, as in the ‘antialien’ social movements of the early 20th century and in the question of assimilation. Antisemitism is particularly identified, among other things, with a conspiratorial worldview, and Marxist accounts of it posit that antisemitism sees the figure of the Jew as the falsely personalised embodiment of the
abstract dimensions of capitalist power (‘socialism of fools’ to quote August Bebel, see Battini, 2016). It also points out that in the 21st century, some have argued for the emergence of a ‘new antisemitism’, associated with Muslims and the Left rather than the Right, but that the conceptual and empirical bases for this have been critiqued as conflating antisemitism with critiques of Israel and the Palestinian occupation. Later in the paper the internal coherence and usefulness (to whom) of such a new definition of antisemitism is examined and how this relates to the relationship between racism and antisemitism is considered.

The SSAHE report, as a whole, represents a certain disciplinary theoretical innovation. A lot of the work in the UK and elsewhere has tended to focus on either issues of racism or issues of migration. Our perspective in the SSAHE report is that we cannot understand one without the other, that they construct each other via different political projects of belonging. This is similar to the way work on antisemitism has also been carried out separately, and sometimes in a mutually exclusionary way, from discussions of other forms of racism and racialisation. In both cases such a separation has been problematic to the understanding of, as well as the fight against, different kinds of racism and racialisations.

To be able to discuss these issues in more depth, the paper focuses around three major contestations which have taken place during the post WW2 era(s), regarding the ways racism and antisemitism and the relationships between them should be analysed. The first contestation examines the different academic disciplinary approaches from which racism and antisemitism need to be studied. The second concerns the relationship between antisemitism, racism and modernity and introduces the notion of ‘new antisemitism’ which
has become entangled in this contestation. The third examines how understanding racism and antisemitism relates to the theory, methodology and politics of intersectionality.

All these debates co-exist and affect each other, but over the decades each has added new layers to the discourses and political debates on these issues.

While describing these contestations, the paper also examines what can be described as ‘the elephant in the room’ in many of these debates – i.e. the roles Israel and Zionism play in these constructions and definitions. The main focus of this paper, however, is to explore the ways different discourses on antisemitism and racism have been contested and interrelated and whether antisemitism should be studied as a form of racism or not.

**Antisemitism, Racism and different academic disciplinary approaches**

The first contestation re the relationships between racism and antisemitism to be discussed here, relates to the question of whether racism and antisemitism need to be studied as social psychological phenomena of individual and small groups; as a social policy problematic; or in political economy terms. These different disciplinary approaches have been often also reflected in popular and political constructions of ‘common sense’ understandings of these issues.

After WW2 there was a great fascination and attempts to understand what makes people and societies racist. Adorno’s influential authoritarian personality theory (Adorno, 2019 [1950?]) attempted to find common personality traits among racists and fascists. This approach has had its own critiques (e.g., Billig and Cramer, 1990; Stone and al., 2012) and, for example, a major differentiation has been drawn between leaders and followers of authoritarian racist movements. It was also debated whether such personality
traits can be found among extreme left as well as extreme right movements. However, generally critiques of this approach shared with it a construction of racism in terms which are very much connected to perceptions and attitudes to others rather than to any more structural macro social issues. Other popular studies with a similar focus at that time (e.g., Asch, 1951) used laboratory experiments to study social relations and the pressure for conformity on ‘normal’ people, whether by other members of their groups or even, as in the (in)famous Milgram (1965) and Stanford (Zimbardo and al., 1971) experiments, by the assumed authority of an anonymous scientific experimenter who urged them to commit atrocities on their subjects or ‘prisoners’.

Many of these studies had been affected by the trauma of WW2, the holocaust and the hegemony of racist Nazi and other fascist ideologies which led them and were supported, or, at least, not opposed to, by most people in these societies. Antisemitism played in these constructions of racism, explicitly or implicitly, a major part but not necessarily a unique model of racism. What characterises this kind of approach to racism and antisemitism is a binary perspective of structure and agency, individual and society and a lack of an historical context. It tends to make generalisations from particular, specific studies of individuals and small quite homogenous groups, as to what universally can cause – and cure – authoritarianism, racism and intolerance. Differences of ethnicity, nationality or ‘race’, as well as class, gender or stage in the life cycle, were, as a rule, invisible in these studies as particular factors affecting these personal traits and social processes. It was taken for granted that antisemitism, as a major form of racism, would disappear in a non-racist and tolerant society.
A separate strand in the study of fascism and racism in that period, more sociological, focused on issues emerging from the migration of ethnically and culturally diverse populations during the economic expansion period of post-WW2. Some of these studies focused on the universal discourse of ‘the other’ and ‘the stranger’ (following the theorisations of Schutz, 1976 or Simmel, 1960) but others (e.g. Eberhardt and Fiske, 1998) looked at the migrants more generally as a ‘social problem’ that needed to be dealt with, assuming that with successful integration, prejudice and racism would disappear – something that Nasar Meer (2022) has recently called ‘cruel optimism’.

Jews do not often appear in these discourses (although in the early 20th century, for example, the perception of poor migrant Jews as a social problem in the UK had triggered the first major immigration legislation in that country (e.g., Pellew, 1989). More recently, Jews have tended to be constructed as exemplary, successfully integrated, minority group (which sometimes has been equated with the ‘whitening of the Jews’ (e.g., Brodkin, 2004).

A counter model, which rejected both social psychological and social policy approaches to tackling racism, has been promoted, especially since the early 1970s, by sociologists and political economists. They presented prejudice and racism as an integral part of past and present colonialist and imperial social, economic and political local and global dynamics (e.g., Zubaida, 2018[1970]).

Racism against Jews, both under Nazism and fascism as well as an ethnic migrant community – especially in the USA - has played important, if not a dominant, role in the anti-racist thinking that pursued social-psychological explanations of racism or migrants as a social problem. It was invisible in the developing anti-racist paradigm, which was preoccupied with colonialism, imperialism and more recently racial capitalism (although the links between
the development of concentration camps in earlier German and other colonialist endeavours, including the Boer war, have started to be drawn out (e.g., Stone, 2017, Van Heyningen, 2009).

Israel and Zionism have been virtually absent from all of these discourses on racism and fascism in this period. They make an appearance when the differences grow more antagonistic in debates relating to issues of antisemitism, racism and modernity.

**Antisemitism, Racism and modernity**

A major debate has taken place concerning the question of whether antisemitism and/or racism are a pathologic incidental of modernity, one dark non-essential facet of it, or its inherent ‘motor of history’. As Amos Goldberg (2022, following Charles Meier, 2000) points out, during the second half of the 20th century, two grand historical-moral narratives based on historical catastrophes, have come to dominate the construction of the origins and meaning of modernity. While these narratives have long histories and grew in different areas in the globe, they have become hegemonic in the post-Soviet era.

The first narrative is that of the Holocaust. The victory of the Allies over Nazism and Fascism and the Nuremberg trials which condemned this genocide as crimes against humanity, have constructed the holocaust as a deviation from the acceptable normative acts that individuals and states operate with under the enlightened values of modernity. While in Israel and within Zionist discourse for many years the emphasis has been on the Holocaust as a marker of specific racialised hatred against the Jews, i.e., antisemitism, much of the
debate in the West focused on it as the underbelly of modernity. The Holocaust needed explaining in this context not in relation to the Jews as victims but in relation to the modern, industrial, and highly ‘civilised’ societies in which it took place (Yuval-Davis and Silverman, 2002). Gillian Rose (2017 [1993]) contrasted the analyses of the Holocaust by Emil Fackenheim (1982) and Zygmunt Bauman (1989) as representing two different constructions of the Holocaust within this context. She claims that ‘Emile Fackenheim’s (1982) Holocaust philosophy argues for the uniqueness of the event, while Zygmunt Bauman’s (1989) Holocaust sociology, developed in his Modernity and the Holocaust, argues for its normality’ (1993: 34).

Rose argues, however, that in the same way that the uniqueness of the Holocaust is also ‘normal’ and its recurrence possible within the logic of antisemitism, so paradoxically the ‘normalcy’ of the Holocaust within the logic of modernity is also unique. Bauman himself argues for the ‘simultaneous uniqueness and normality of the Holocaust’ as a modern genocide which ‘brings together some ordinary factors of modernity which normally are kept apart’ (1989: 94).

It is important to point out, however, that this debate on the uniqueness or not of the Holocaust in modernity, including Bauman’s insightfully nuanced theorisation, remains Eurocentric. Bauman’s gaze, for instance, does not apply his analysis of modernity and the Holocaust to the commodification of slaves and other practices of colonialism and imperialism – including the concentration camps (Rattansi, 2017). Indeed, imperialism and transnational capitalism have often been seen by Westerners, including Marxists, as bringing progressive modernity to other parts of the globe (e.g., Kiely, 2005).
The other contesting foundational narrative about modernity that Goldberg and Meier discuss, however, sees the development of the Global North, not the Global South, as benefiting from slavery, colonialism and imperialism, which is seen as a continuous facilitator of the existence of the ‘developed’ world under racial capitalism - ‘accumulation by dispossession’, to use David Harvey’s title of chapter 4 in his (2003) book. (See also Robinson 2020 [1983]; Bhattacharyya, 2018). In this narrative, racism is not a deviation but the underlying distributive principle of modernity, as well as the major source of the accumulation of Western capitalism which facilitated as well as embodied modernity. It did this by exploiting, extracting, destroying and dispossessioning valuable resources, commodities and labour from the Global South.

While antisemitism, via the Holocaust, has played the main role in the construction of racism in the Holocaust catastrophic foundational narrative of modernity, it has been virtually absent in the one which focuses on racisms against non-White non-European groupings of people living in the Global South, constituting migrant communities in the global North and/or living and dying in grey zones on global borderingscapes (Yuval-Davis and al., 2018, 2019). Racialised practices of exploitation and/or exclusion which took place towards European minorities, whether Jews, Roma or the nomad Sami in Northern Europe, have tended to be absent from this dominant discourse which constructs the globe in a binary North/South.

These two narratives on modernity, although they can also be seen as complementary as they have sometimes been described especially in the 1950s (Rothberg, 2009 but also see Gilroy, 1993), have progressively diverged and have clashed more and more about the issue of Israel and the Palestinians in recent years.
The Palestinian case was generally absent from international discourses, including the anti-colonial ones, in the period of 1948-1967. This changed with the further occupation of the West Bank and Gaza after the 1967 war, which gradually highlighted the plight of the Palestinians under Zionist settlement and the on-going policies of the Israeli state since its establishment in 1948 and especially after 1967. As could be seen from the support of two thirds of the members of the United Nations Assembly for the establishment of the Israeli state in 1947, it was seen then as the positive outcome and solution to antisemitism post-WW2. Of course, there were also many other political and strategic reasons for this support, but the normative narrative at the time supported the Zionist argument that only a Jewish state would guarantee that ‘never again’ would Jews be threatened with genocide.

That this ‘neat’ solution to the ‘Jewish problem’ had correlatively caused the Palestinian Nakba and their dispossession, gradually came to be a dominant narrative within the anti-colonial argument after the victory against apartheid South Africa in 1993 and the growing exposure of Israeli mode of governance of the Occupied Territories (see, e.g., Chomsky, 1999; Pappe, 2002; Yiftachel, 2006). In the diverse narratives about modernity and racism, fighting against antisemitism and fighting against racism against Southerners has become more and more a zero-sum game – if you support the Palestinians, you are “against” Israel and therefore, by some, are thus seen as antisemitic.

Pivotal to the understanding of this contestation, which grew during the 2000s, is the growing political presence of the discourse of ‘new antisemitism’ (Lerman, 2015). In this discourse, any critique of Zionism as a settler colonial movement and a critique of the right of Israel to exist as a Zionist state in which non-Jews, (including the indigenous Palestinians who currently constitute more
than 20% of Israeli formal citizenry, not counting the Occupied Territories which changes the population ratio to roughly 50:50), do not have full, equal rights, is seen as antisemitic.

The growing hegemony of the ‘new Antisemitism’ discourse, cannot be seen only as an outcome of a successfully orchestrated international diplomatic campaign by Israel and Israeli supporters, although this, of course has played a pivotal role. One of its earlier highlights was the declaration of Holocaust Memorial Day as a formal international Memorial Day on 2005. In the same year the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), adopted a working definition of antisemitism that eventually in 2016 was adopted by the IHRA (International Holocaust Remembrance Association). This definition has consequently been adopted by more than a thousand institutions and organisations internationally. The definition itself is very short (only 38 words), very loose and opaque and is accompanied by eleven illustrative examples of application, seven of which mention Israel. It has been widely criticised as inadequate and/or incoherent. However, its legal adoption, as well as passing related laws, which define any support of the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement as antisemitism, is having major social and political exclusionary and even criminalising effects. The fact that most UK Labour party members who have been suspended or expelled from the party for antisemitism are Jews but anti-zionist, is another pertinent example.

The transformation of antisemitism into an Israeli-focused ‘new antisemitism’ has been facilitated by the construction of Israel as the collective identity of all Jews, whether they live in Israel or not and whether they consider themselves
Zionist or not. It was as such that Israel received reparations for the Nazi Holocaust from Germany – reparations that have not yet been made available to individuals and states of the descendants of slavery and the colonized. This identity politics has been enhanced after 1967 by what Jamie Hakim (2015) has called ‘popular Zionism’, which has grown among mainstream Jews, identifying with Israel as their collective identity, as well as their potential ‘safe haven’ in case of renewed threat to Jewish diasporic existence.

This kind of identity politics has been a receptive context for a concerted political campaign which has used this mutation of antisemitism as a justification of extreme right Zionist ethno-nationalism. One of prominent theorists of this construction of antisemitism is Yossi Shain, a prominent Tel-Aviv University professor and a member of parliament for the right wing Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Home) Party. Shain (2019) has argued that antisemitism is not anymore ‘the Jewish question’ but the ‘Israel question’. Tony Lerman quotes from one of his 2021 speeches in which he said: The ‘Jewish Question … the antisemitism of the past, is dead. What matters today is the “viral delegitimisation of Israel … the Israeliisation of antisemitism which seeks “genocide”’ (Lerman, 2022:268), as Israel, the embodiment of contemporary Jewish collective identity, is these days the ‘persecuted nation’ – notwithstanding the extensive international diplomatic, military and economic support Israel continuously has been receiving.

**Antisemitism, Racism and Intersectionality**

Intersectionality, hailed by Leslie McCall (2005) and many others as the most important contribution of feminist studies to social theory, has also come, bizarrely, to be seen as an arena of ‘bigotry’ by those, like Prof. Allen
Dershowitz (2017), who called ‘All decent people must join in calling out intersectionality for what it is: a euphemism for anti-American, anti-Semitic and anti-Israel bigotry.’

This collapse of antisemitism in his statement not only to the equivalence of critique of Israel and Zionism but also to ‘anti-Americanism’, is worth an in-depth analysis on its own, for which there is no space to deal with here. However, this statement by Dershowitz also constitutes a clear formulation of the construction of the zero-sum relationship between racism and antisemitism as mutually exclusive. Why have Dershowitz and others, like Batya Ungar-Sargon (2018) and Karin Stoegner (2020) been focusing on intersectionality as, to quote the title of Dershowitz’ article ‘a code name for antisemitism’?

Part of the answer concerns the growing importance of women among the Left and among leading resistance movements to hegemonic powers all over the world, from indigenous people’s movements to anti-war movements. Many of these women are feminists who have been fighting patriarchal power relations within their own communities as well as against hegemonic powers of racism, imperialism and neoliberalism. They increasingly occupy leadership positions in the Left, especially but not only in the USA. Much of the general critique of Israel and its occupation policies which has steadily grown since the Palestinian issue replaced Apartheid South Africa as a symbol of neo-colonialism and imperialism, has been taken up by such ‘intersectional’ feminists. They support the Palestinian struggle and the BDS campaign and oppose Israel’s on-going settler colonial and apartheid policies. To the extent that they have gained political authority (such as in the case of “the Squad” of four black democratic congresswomen), they have been seen as a special threat. However, many of
the attacks of the pro-Israeli lobby have also been directed against campus activists, both students and academics and other social movements.

Another part of the answer is, as mentioned above and illustrated so well by Dershowitz, is ‘the new antisemitism’ assumption that if particular anti-racist activists who define themselves as intersectional refuse to cooperate with those who support Israel and its occupation policies, then they are antisemitic. The fact that these women worked at the same time together with groups like the Jewish Voice for Peace who do not support these policies, notwithstanding, as the Jewish Voice for Peace and other non-Zionist Jewish organisations do not share the construction of ‘new antisemitism’ – ‘the Israel question’ as their definition of antisemitism.

Yet another part of the answer, however, is due to contested issues, especially identity politics, among activists and scholars who define themselves as having adopted an intersectionality approach, although I would challenge this. To explain the issues involved, however, I need to describe briefly what is meant by intersectionality.

Intersectionality – different versions of it - has become an important analytical tool politically, academically and in many international as well as national activism and policy forums all over the globe (e.g., Brah and Phoenix, 2004; Yuval-Davis, 2006; Lutz and al., 2016; Hill Collins and Bilge, 2020). Although many feminists have worked on similar issues for many years politically and in different academic disciplines, the term intersectionality has been adopted from the works of Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), a black feminist professor of Law who wanted to expose forms of discrimination specific for groupings of black women workers in the USA. More generally, Crenshaw and other intersectionality scholars, criticised identity politics as centring on a single
category of discrimination—for example, race or gender—which ignore intragroup differences between, say, black men and women or white and black women.

Intersectionality, therefore, is not a new theory of identity. Epistemologically, intersectionality can be described as a development of feminist standpoint theory (Harraway; 1991; see also Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis, 2002). It is interested in the ways differential situatedness of different social agents relate to the ways they affect and are affected by different social, economic and political projects. Only by encompassing the different situated gazes can one approach ‘the truth’ (Collins, 2000; see also Yuval-Davis, 2015; Yuval-Davis and al., 2019). This dialogical epistemology of intersectionality is one of the outcomes of the mobilisation and proliferation of different identity groups’ struggles for recognition. However, it is also, especially in some interpretations of it, like in situated intersectionality, an alternative to it. It avoids some of its pitfalls, such as relativism, conflating social categories and social groupings, individuals and collectives. It rejects homogenising and reifying social categories and thus avoids suppressing the visibility of intra-group power relations and plural voices who share social positionings but differ in their emotional identifications and normative values. Identity politics tends to do all this for the sake of raising the visibility of the social grouping/social category they mobilise and/or campaign for.

Part of the contestation among different versions of intersectionality has been the question of whether intersectionality loses its political edge when it is applied beyond the original focus of Crenshaw’s study of racialised minoritised black women (e.g., Bilge, 2013). Or whether it can and should be applied as an
analytical generic critical social theory (Collins, 2019) and/or as an alternative to sociological stratification theory (Yuval-Davis, 2015), without losing its political edge but rather widening it. In this way, it can provide a comparative context for specific racialisations and other axes of power relations without running the risk of substituting fragmented identity politics (e.g., homogenising all Black women or all White male working class) for the rejected binary ones. The US 2018 Women’s March has been a major target of those who construct intersectionality as antisemitic. Officially it followed the ‘union’ principle that brought women in their millions to march annually after the election of Trump to the US presidency. However, gradually, in-fighting and exclusionary identity politics concerning people’s colour and sexuality, became more and more frequent and accusations of antisemitism started also to be prevalent. Most of the attacks re antisemitism focused on the March organizers’ rejection of people who identify themselves not just as Jews but also as Zionists or supporters of the Israeli state. Such a rejection is completely coherent with an anti-racist perspective which applies universal criteria of justice and human rights to all, including Jews and Palestinians. However, it was also reported (Lowe, 2018) that one of the original organisers of the Women’s March was ousted due to her Jewish origin, claiming that ‘Jews needed to confront their own role in racism’ (others called for all White women who wanted to take part in the March to do the same). Such an approach reifies and homogenises all Jews (and Whites) and reinstates the identity politics problematic of ‘Oppression Olympics’ which constructs a uni-dimensional hierarchisation of oppression and racialisation rather than a multi-faceted one. Moreover, it assumes a binary division: people can be either racist or victims of racism, oppressors or oppressed, when we know that often the issues involved are much more complicated and nuanced. The feminist movement was the first to
point out that the same working class oppressed heroes come home and beat their wives.

The political power of situated intersectionality is, indeed, that unlike some of the more simplistic anti-racist and anti-imperialist ideologies, it generally rejects dichotomies of inherent ‘goodies’ and ‘baddies’. It understands power relations, including different forms of racialisation, as being mutually constituted and shaped by different social divisions. And it differentiates between social positionings, identifications and normative values of people. At a time when more than half the candidates for the British Conservative party leadership have been women and/or from racialised minorities, the importance of such intersectional analysis which separates these different facets of people’s situated gazes, is more important than ever. And while conflicts of interest do incur in particular times and places among people of different social positioning, there is no inherent normative conflict in fighting against all forms of oppression and racism, including anti-Jewish racisms.

However, binary identity politics is very convenient for those who want to construct antisemitism and racism as mutually exclusive, as can be seen, for example, from the work of Karin Stoegner (e.g., 2020, 2021), who is considered an academic authority in the field of intersectionality and antisemitism.

Basically, Stoegner has two conflicting constructions of that relation. On the one hand she sees racism as constituting a necessary part of antisemitic ideology. As she says (2020\textsuperscript{iii}):

\begin{quote}
In regard of antisemitism as a phenomenon, we can say that we will fail to grasp its complexity if we see it {\it only} as a form of racism; but we will not understand it if we do not \textit{also} recognise it as a form of racism.
\end{quote}
On the other hand, she equates racism with anti-Black racism and sees it as its complete opposition. She says (op.cit.):

The *differences* between antisemitism and racism are clear. Both colonial and apartheid racism is based on the hierarchical construction of supposedly superior and inferior races (Balibar 2005). The enemy, constructed as primitive and inferior, represents a lack of civilisation and modernity, while racists consider themselves representatives of civilisation.

Absent are conspiracy myths presuming People of Colour and colonised people secretly rule the world, control the media and finance, and accelerate the processes of modernisation, globalisation and cosmopolitanism. These are *not* usually part of racist ideology. Such conspiracy myths, however, *are* an essential feature of antisemitism.

This contradiction is not only theoretically unfeasible, as something cannot be an element of something else and at the same time completely different from it, but the definition also reduces racism and antisemitism into two dichotomous ahistorical and homogenous constructions that affect all Jews and all Blacks which are constructed as collective identities, anytime anywhere in the same way. Other forms of specific racialisations, such as of Asians as too smart and dishonest, for example, or of Jews as poor dirty migrants in the East End, which do not fit her specific constructions, are cancelled out. As are many other racialised groupings in the global North and South, from Roma to Rohingya, which are completely excluded from this conceptualisation of racism and racialisation.

According to Stoegner, who has written about intersectionality and antisemitism in the context of discussing antisemitism and antizionism,
intersectionality is a political program which is aimed to oppose any construction of Israel and Zionism as a Jewish national liberation project and instead viewing it as a settler colonial project. This is an important and valid political debate, in which I have a clear position (i.e. in a nutshell⁴, that many Zionists, like my parents, subjectively believed that Zionism is not only a national liberation movement but a utopian socialist movement. Historically, however, the Zionist movement has been a settler colonial movement and its project of social and national liberation has been exclusionary and racialised and its effectivity long term in solving ‘the Jewish problem’ is problematic in several important ways⁵). However, we need to separate this from analysing the relationships between racism and antisemitism and even more importantly, defining what they are.

**Conclusion**

The different relationships discussed in this paper on racism and antisemitism have basically constructed them in four different contested ways. In one, dominating especially social psychological studies of fascism, racism and social conformity, antisemitism and what happened to the Jews during WW2 has been, explicitly or implicitly, the archetype of racism and the people and social conditions under which people tend to become racist. A somewhat similar approach, although with much more historical specificity, was developed in the narrative according to which the Holocaust and its underwritten antisemitic ideology is an aberration, as well as an outcome, of the dark side of modernity. The second, present in sociological and social policy studies, have tended to focus on ethnic and migrant communities and their own specific racialisations. Here antisemitism has functioned as just one - and in the post WW2 period
often quite a minor one – of different specific forms of racialisations with their own histories and signifiers among many.

A third construction of the relationship between racism and antisemitism has operated in Marxist, post-colonial and subaltern studies. In this approach racism is the ideology which has legitimised colonialism, imperialism and slavery, directed against the non-White inhabitants of the global South and their migrant communities in the North. Antisemitism, as well as racisms against other Northern racialised minorities, are invisible and/or irrelevant (as are often racialisations of minorities within the South by more dominant other Southern communities).

The fourth construction has been conflictual and has tended to focus around the Palestinian issue as an illustrative forefront of contemporary Southern colonised and occupied populations. This approach is promoted by the supporters of the mutation of antisemitism into ‘new antisemitism’ and the legal adoption of the IHRA definition of antisemitism and its illustrative examples the majority of which concern Israel. It views all those who criticise Zionism as a colonial settler state and the occupation policies of the Israeli state as apartheid, as antisemitic by definition.

As I mentioned at the beginning of the article, definitions have no inherent truth. They are agreed conventions tested by their internal coherence as well as by their relationship to common sense, common practice and history. They are not neutral but are shaped by underlying political values and interests, as can be seen in relation to all four formulations of racism and antisemitism described in the paper. They each emerged in specific social, political and disciplinary specific contexts but they function as resources, inspirations and determinants of everyday common sense. But definitions do not only have
their own social causes and contexts but also their own social consequences and effects. While each of the four relationships have their own strengths and weaknesses as discussed above, only the fourth relationship, which position racism and antisemitism on collision course in the service of particular constructions of identity politics is not just indifferent to the targets of particular forms of racism, both Palestinians and Jews who do not fall within the hegemonic image of what Jews should be/feel/believe in. It actually harms them by informal and legal stigmatisation and even criminalisation.

Thus, the question regarding which approaches to the relationship between racism and antisemitism should be chosen by public sociologists who are fighting for social justice and against social inequalities, is not an open one. We need to reject all definitions of racism which are constructed by specific forms of identity politics which homogenise social categories and social groupings, from members of a specific ethnic community to constructing a binary global North or South. Instead, we need a dialogical epistemological approach to the issue which encompasses particular situated intersectional gazes on the one hand and generic transversal (to differentiate from the homogenising which is often the Eurocentric universal) conceptualisations on the other hand. Focusing on vernacular formations of racialisations towards specific groupings in particular times and spaces is important, not only emotionally and politically to the people involved, but also analytically, in order to help decentring and widening our generic understanding of the meaning of our definition of the processes of racialisation. Only such a dialogical approach can prevent identity politics relativism in which each grouping has its own decontextualised truth which ignores social positionings, social structures and power relations with other groupings or gets into competitive and divisive conflictual relationships with them. It would also prevent a Eurocentric perspective in
which the West is the only, either relevant location and/or the only relevant actor in determining processes of racialisation.

In other words, future research on all forms of racism should operationalise what it studies in a dialogical process with its research participants and encompass their situated gazes into its constructions of the racialisation processes studied. Important in such research would be a multi-local, multipositional and multi-temporal, if possible, perspectives, within, as well as between, global North and South. The findings of such research should be contextualised and analysed within an encompassing de-centred non-Eurocentric conceptualisation of racism. Not an easy task, but at least partly possible when envisaged as building blocks of an accumulative learning process of different forms of racism.

This brings me back to the definition of racism I presented at the introduction to the paper and my argument that antisemitism, or antisemitic thinking and practices, can and should only be understood as some of the specific forms of racialisation which many of us, as sociologists, study, and against which, as public sociologists, fight against.

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### Notes:

The report has been written (in alphabetical order) by Prof. Molly Andrews; Prof. Madeleine Arnot; Prof. Floya Anthias; Dr. Stephen Ashe; Prof. Avtar Brah; Prof Giorgia Dona; Dr. Umut Erel; Dr. Ben Gidley; Rachel Humphris; Prof. Elenore Kofman; Dr. Aurelien Mondon; Prof. Karim Murji; Prof. Ann Phoenix; Prof. Nando Sigona; Prof. Corinne Squire; Dr. Nuria Targarona; Dr. Georgie Wemyss; Dr. Aaron Winter; Prof. Nira Yuval-Davis.

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Actually, many anti-Zionist Jews argued that gathering all the Jews in one territory heightens rather than lowers the danger for the continued collective existence of all Jews, as the Jews in Palestine were saved during WW2 from a similar fate to Jews in all other countries under Nazi occupation not because of an inherent characteristics of Zionism but because the Nazis were defeated before reaching Palestine. (see, e.g. Wien, 2010)

See, for example.

https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitionscharters/working-definition-antisemitism: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”

https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitionscharters/working-definition-antisemitism/adoption-endorsement

See, for example, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2023/apr/24/un-ihra-antisemitism-definition-israel-criticism;
https://bdsmovement.net/ campaign calling for boycott, divestments and sanctions against Israel as a way to put pressure on Israel to end the occupation.


See, e.g., https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uk-labour-antisemitism-accused-purgingjews-over-claims

https://www.972mag.com/black-democrats-palestine-congress/

https://womensmarch.com/mission-and-principles

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For a more detailed argument please see, for example, Yuval-Davis 2020 [1984] and 2002.

In between writing the first draft of the article in summer 2022 and the submission of its final draft in early September 2023, the election of an extreme right Israeli government and its attempt of judicial coup which has caused an unprecedent protest movement in Israel, have also brought many former ‘right or wrong’ Israeli supporters to start to change their position, although I don’t think their attachment, to Israel. It is too early to predict what will be the effect of this change on international support of the IHRA definition of antisemitism. The breakout of war in October, might hasten such a transformation. On the one hand, there have been major Jewish as well as non-Jewish protests against Israel, including one in New York which necessitated the temporary closure of Grand Central Station in which Jews protested against Israel ‘not in our name’ (https://www.timesofisrael.com/200-held-as-
jewish-group-shuts-nycs-grand-central-calling-for-gaza-ceasefire/) and on the other hand, support of the Palestinian cause has become more than ever a signifier of antisemitism as when Suela Braverman, the British Home Secretary interpreted the pro-Palestinian demonstrations in London, as antisemitic ‘hate marches’ and is threatening to outlaw them (https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/oct/30/uk-ministers-cobra-meeting-terrorism-threat-israel-hamas-conflict-suella-braverman).

xvi My work on such a dialogical epistemological and methodological approach was developed as part of the work on situated intersectionality and transversal politics (e.g., Yuval-Davis, 2015; 2023; Yuval-Davis & al, 2019)